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A. Summary o f  Respondents' Position On Appeal. 
The Respondent State of Idaho (hereinafter "the State") asserts that by filing pretrial 
motions with the Magistrate Court in the underlying case, that the Appellant Mr. Gilbert Livas' 
(hereinafter "Livas") applied for the postponement of his trial. The State further takes the 
position that the reason for any delay in Livas' trial taking place within the six month speedy 
trial period as set forth in I.C. $ 19-3501, was duc only to Livas' filing of the subject pretrial 
motions. Therefore, the State asserts, the lower Courts correctly held that dismissal was not 
mandated. 
B. Pacts Relevant T o  Brief O f  Respondent. 
As noted in the briefing submitted by the parties, which record is not disputed, Livas 
entered his non-guilty plea on September 14, 2006 (Ii., p. 95-96). Thereafter the Magistrate 
Court entered a notice of trial setting for November 6,2006. Livas filed a motion to suppress on 
October 10, 2008. On that same date, the Magistrate Court, sua sponte, vacated the trial setting 
and reset the trial for December 12,2006. Livas did not request that the trial setting of 
November 6,2006, be vacated, nor did the State object to the vacating of the trial date. 
The evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress was scheduled for November 29, 
2006, however, that hearing was vacated by the Court, sua sponte, and reset to take place on 
December 11,2006. On that same date, the Magistrate Court, sua sponte, vacated the December 
12,2006 trial date, without resetting the trial. Livas did not request that the December 12,2006 
trial date be vacated, nor did the State object to the vacating of the trial date. 
The Magistrate Court entered a written decision denying the motion to suppress on 
December 27,2006. Within a week, Livas filed a motion to reconsider. The hearing on that 
motion was not scheduled by the Magistrate Court until February 16,2006. There is nothing in 
the record indicating that the State requested an earlier hearing date, or that the Magistrate Court 
make a ruling on the pleadings without hearing. The motion to reconsider was denied on April 
The Magistrate Court finally issued a notice of trial setting on May 2, 2007, setting the 
trial for .July 24,2007. 
At no time did the Court or the State inquire if Livas consented to waive his rights, 
Following the Magistrate Court's vacating the original November 6,2006 trial setting, at 
no time did the State request that a trial be reset within the statutory speedy trial period, raise the 
issue of speedy trial or otherwise assert that there was "good cause" that the case was proceeding 
beyond the speedy trial period set forth in I.C. 19-3501. 
C. The District Court Erred When It Concluded The Magistrate Court Properly 
Exercised Its Discretion When It Denied Livas' Motion To Dismiss. 
There are two holdings of the Magistrate Court, affirmed by the District Court, that are 
challenged through this appeal. The first holding is that Livas caused the trial to be set outside 
the statutory limits or, that the trial was postponed upon Livas' application. (R., p. 98). The 
second holding is that there was "good cause" to set the trial outside of the speedy trial date, and 
that Livas identified no prejudice in the underlying case resulting from the delay. Id, 
1. The Lower Courts Erred In  Holding That Livas "Applied" For The 
Postponement Of Any Trial Setting. 
At no time did Livas request that any trial setting be vacated, nor did Livas object to 
maintaining any of the trial settings that were scheduled by the Magistrate Court to take place 
within the statutory speedy trial period. The Magistrate Court vacated the trial settings sua 
sponte and without objection by the State. 
The State's argument that because Livas filed pretrial motions, he somehow caused the 
trials to be reset is erroneous. In the event that Livas was asked to waive his speedy trial rights 
and he refused, there is nothing that would have prevented the Magistrate Court from proceeding 
with a trial, even if a decision on Livas' pretrial motions had to be made immediately prior to, or 
on "the eve" of that trial. 
Livas made every effort to promptly file all pretrial motions. The State simply failed to 
address, in any manner, Livas' right to speedy trial. 
There are no facts in the record of the underlying case sufficient to support the lower 
Courts' respective holdings that Livas applied to delay the trial of his case. 
2. The Lower Courts Erred In Holding There Was Good Cause For The Delay 
Of Livas' Trial. 
With regard to the Magistrate Court's second holding pertaining to "good cause" - the 
error in the Magistrate Court's analysis and the District Court's analysis, is they did not 
acknowledge that the duty to bring a defendant to trial lies with the State, not a defendant. State 
v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 837, 118 P.3d 160, 169 (Ct. App. 2005). 
If a case is not tried within six months of the date oFa defendant's not guilty plea, the 
case "shall" be dismissed, unless good cause is shown for the delay, which cause must rise to the 
level of a legal excuse. State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255,16 P.3d 931 (2000)(emphasis added). 
The legal excuse must be the excuse of the State, not Livas.l 
If a defendant does not waive his right to speedy trial, then he or she must operate within 
the confines of a trial setting scheduled to take place within the speedy trial period. 
In arguing that the legal excuse for the delay is Livas' filing of pretrial motions, the State 
is attempting to shift the burden. Such burden shifting is clearly contradicted by precedent case 
law. 
The Magistrate Court's sua sponte actions did not relieve the State of the burden to bring 
Livas' case to trial within six months of the entry of the not guilty plea, 
The Magistrate and District Courts were also in error in applying the factors in Barker v. 
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1 972) to the facts of this case. The Idaho Supreme Court in Clark, supra, 
held that the Barker factors should only be considered, if at all, only insofar as they bear on the 
sufficiency of the reason itself. Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936 (emphasis added). 
The Magistrate and the District Courts both claim that good cause existed for denying the 
motion because Livas did not argue that he was prejudiced by the delay of the trial. However, 
the case law is very clear that Courts should not look to the issue of prejudice when and until the 
State has established a legal excuse for not bringing a defendant to trial, which the State in this 
1 Quoting the State's Brief "[wlhen a defendant who moves to dismiss his case pursuant to I.C. 
9 19-3501(4) shows that trial was not postponed at his request, the burden then shifts to the 
state [to] demonstrate good cause for the court to decline to dismiss the case." Brief of 
Respondent, p. 6, citing State v. Rodriguez-Perez, 129 Idaho 29,37,921 P.2d 206,215 (Ct. 
App. 1996). 
case simply did not do. The issue of prejudice should not have been discussed as a Barker 
factor, and should not have been considered by either the Magistrate or District Courts because it 
did not pertain to the sufficiency or the reason for the delay. Livas nor the State ever asserted in 
the underlying case that Livas would be prejudiced if the trial was or was not delayed. 
In this case there are no facts sufficient to substantiate a holding that the State set forth a 
substantial reason for the delay in Livas' trial that rises to the level of legal excuse, and pursuant 
to Idaho Code 5 19-3501(4), the Magistrate Court should have dismissed this case. 
Like the facts of Clark, supra, the Magistrate Judge in this case reset the trial beyond the 
statutory limit without objection by the State, and without a showing of legal excuse by the State. 
Tellingly, Judge Copsey stated that if a "defendant does move to suppress or files pretrial 
motions, he cannot use those to delay trial and then assert speedy trial as a sword." (R., p. 99). 
There is no evidence in the record that Livas' motions in fact delayed the Magistrate Court from 
resetting the trial within the time frame for speedy trial. The Magistrate simply vacated and reset 
the trial sua sponte, without comment from the prosecution or counsel for Livas. 
1f this Court accepts the State's argument and the rationale of the Magistrate and District 
Courts, it would essentially be holding that where a defendant files a pretrial motion, the State no 
longer has to concern itself with defendants' speedy trial rights. Such a holding defies the very 
underpinnings of I.C. 4 19-3501. 
D. Conclusion 
There are not facts or evidence in the record from the underlying case sufficient to 
support the lower Courts' holdings that Livas applied to have his trial delayed, or that the State 
established good cause or legal excuse to delay Livas' trial. The Magistrate erred in denying 
Livas' motion to dismiss rict Court erred in affirming the Magistrate's decision. 
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